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Abstract
Slantchev (2003, American Political Science Review, 97) studies a class of negotiation
models to explain costly conflict between two completely informed nations. In one of his
main propositions (Proposition 2.3), Slantchev provides a strategy profile to support the
so−called extremal subgame perfect equilibrium, where one nation receives its lowest
equilibrium payoff. By means of a counter example, we demonstrate the existence of an
equilibrium with one nation's payoffs below the strategy profile provided in his Proposition
2.3 (Case 2).
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1 Introduction
In a recent article, Slantchev (2003) discusses the merits of analyzing warfare as a negotia-
tion process between two nations in the shadow of ghting. Wielding actions of warfare is
an intangible part of such processes that may inuence the nal resolution. This negotiation
process is modeled as a bargaining game with endogenous threats, also known as the nego-
tiation model pioneered by Haller and Holden (1990), Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Haller
(1991), Bolt (1995) and Houba and Bolt (2000) in the context of wage contract negotia-
tions and followed by Busch and Wen (1995) and Houba (1997) in a general context of the
disagreement game. Slantchev (2003) analyzes a class of negotiation games where there is
one disagreement outcome dominating any other disagreement outcome while the two na-
tions have di¤erent time preferences that are modelled as discount factors. When discount
factors are su¢ ciently large, this negotiation model generally admits many equilibrium out-
comes featuring costly ghting before a delayed peace treaty can be reached, despite many
restrictions to stack the model against ghting. The strategy proles supporting those
equilibria, however, critically depend upon every nations worst or extremal equilibrium.
These extremal equilibria represent a nations worst fear of what might happen if it would
unilaterally cease re and, therefore, what keeps nations trapped in continuing the warfare.
The purpose of this note is to alert the scientic community of the complications involved
with extremal SPE in the negotiation model when two nations have di¤erent time preferences.
For that purpose, we critically re-examine a claim in Slantchev (2003) about the extremal
equilibrium: By means of a simple counter example, we demonstrate that the supposedly
extremal strategy prole provided in Proposition 2.3 (Case 2) of Slantchev (2003) is not
necessarily the extremal equilibrium to the nation with a lower discount factor, no matter
how close the two discount factors are to 1. The proof of Proposition 2.3 in Slantchev (2003)
merely veries that the stated strategy prole constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE). The strategy prole extends the extremal SPE when the two nations have the same
discount factor, with appropriate modications to the case where the two nations di¤er in
their discount factors. Under the framework of Slantchevs model, our counter example
demonstrates a simple SPE where the nation with a lower discount factor receives less than
from what Slantchev claims to be this nation extremal SPE.
Our counter example is presented in the next section and a concluding remark is put in
a separate section.
2 The Counter Example
We now provide an example to demonstrate that the SPE provided in Part 2 of Proposition
2.3 in Slantchev (2003) fails to be the extremal SPE to the nation whose discount factor is
lower than the other nations, no matter how small both discount factors are. Consider the
warfare negotiation model with the following symmetric disagreement game:
1
1 n 2 L M R
T 1
2
; 1
2
0; 0 0; 0
M 0; 0 0; 0 0; 
B 0; 0 ; 0 0; 0
where 0   < 1
2
. As constructed, this disagreement game has one Nash equilibrium a =
(T; L) that Pareto dominates any other disagreement outcome and it is on the bargaining
frontier. In order to reduce the number of equilibrium conditions, we assume three other
Nash equilibria: (B;R), (M;R) and (B;M), of which Nash equilibrium (M;R) turns out
to be crucial. This disagreement game satises all the assumptions imposed in Slantchev
(2003).
In order to support nation 1s extremal SPE, Slantchev suggests to maximize nation
2s disagreement payo¤ by describing (T; L) in all odd periods and minimize nation 1s dis-
agreement payo¤by describing (B;R) in all even periods. Since both disagreement outcomes,
(T; L) and (B;R), are Nash equilibria in the disagreement game, a SPE can be derived based
on the innite sequence of alternating between these two disagreement outcomes. Proposi-
tion 2.3 of Slantchev (2003) identies the following two equilibria:
A. When 1  2, both nations will make acceptable proposals. Accordingly, nation 1
receives 1
2
1 2
1 12 in any odd period and
1
2
1(1 2)
1 12 in any even period.
B. When 1 < 2, only nation 2 makes an acceptable proposal. Accordingly, nation 1
receives 1
2
1
1+1
in any odd period and 1
2
1
1+1
in any even period.
It is easy to see why nation 1 behaves di¤erently in these two cases. Given the alternating
disagreement outcomes, nation 1 can secure a payo¤ of 1
2
1
1+1
in any odd period and 1
2
1
1+1
in
any even period from simply collecting its alternating disagreement payo¤s 1
2
and 0 forever,
called the no-concession strategy by Bolt (1995) in the wage negotiation model. Nation 1
will make an acceptable proposal if and only if
1
2
1  2
1  12 
1
2
1
1 + 1
, 1  2: (1)
Slantchev (2003) claims that Proposition 2.3 characterizes nation 1s extremal SPE in these
two cases.
Now we present a SPE strategy prole from which nation 1 receives strictly less than
1
2
1
1+1
in any odd period and 1
2
1
1+1
in any even period for most of 1 < 2. Consider the
following strategy prole:
C. Both nations make acceptable proposals that are calculated from the constant sequence
of disagreement outcomes (M;R) in all periods, and the two nations would play the
Nash equilibrium (M;R) in any disagreement game.
It is obvious that no nation has an incentive to deviate in the disagreement game. Unlike
the SPE of described by strategy prole B, forever collecting the disagreement payo¤s yields
nation 1 a payo¤of 0. Suppose that nation 1 proposes (x1; 1 x1) and nation 2 proposes (1 
x2; x2). After rejecting a proposal, the responding nation will receive his disagreement payo¤
2
during the current period and his equilibrium share in the following period. A responding
nation should be indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the standing o¤er:
1  x1 = (1  2) + 2x2 and 1  x2 = 1x1;
which yield nation 1s payo¤s in an odd period and an even period as
x1 =
1  2
1  12 (1  ) and 1  x2 =
1(1  2)
1  12 (1  ) : (2)
If nation 1 makes an unacceptable proposal in an o¤er period, its payo¤will be 1 (1  x2) =
21x1 < x1. Therefore, nation 1 cannot benet from the no-concession strategy in strategy
prole C. This establishes that the strategy prole C is a SPE.
Now the issue is whether x1 and 1x1 in (2) are less than nation 1s SPE payo¤s predicted
by Proposition 2.3 of Slantchev (2003). First observe that
x1 =
1  2
1  12 (1  ) >
1
2
1  2
1  12
for all  2 [0; 1
2
). This implies that when 1  2, the SPE resulted from strategy prole A
yields nation 1 a lower payo¤ then our SPE of strategy prole C. When 1 < 2, however,
we have
x1 =
1  2
1  12 (1  ) <
1
2
1
1 + 1
; (3)
which yields
 >   1
2
  1
2
2   1
(1 + 1) (1  2) :
Obviously, 1 < 2 implies 
 < 1
2
. In other words, when 1 < 2, (3) holds for all  2
 
; 1
2

.
Moreover, it is even possible to obtain  < 0, which requires 2 > 1+212+1 which is larger than
1. This last result means that for a large set of parameter values 1 < 2, no value of  can
be found such that the SPE of strategy prole B is nation 1s worst SPE.
Figure 1 illustrates the region of 1 and 2 for which the strategy prole C yields nation 1
a lower equilibrium payo¤ than the SPE resulted from strategy prole B. Since this requires
that nation 2 is relatively more patient than nation 1, it follows that strategy prole A is
not a SPE when 1 < 2. The curved boundary of region C depends upon  and this curve
shifts downward as  increases with the forty-ve degree line at the border case  = 1
2
. So,
region C expands as  increases and covers about one quarter to half of the unit square. So,
region C is quite large.
3 Concluding Remark
The key implication of our examples is that when nations have di¤erent time preferences,
the current game theoretic literature fails to characterize the lowest equilibrium payo¤s, not
only in the warfare negotiation model of Slantchev (2003), but also in the general negotiation
model of Busch andWen (1995). Thus far, only a few have analyzed di¤erent time preferences
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Figure 1: Condition (3) for  = 0,  = 1
4
and  = 1
2
. The region where the strategy prole
C yields nation 1 a payo¤ lower than strategy prole B is indicated by C.
in the negotiation model (often for some restrictive class of disagreement games). The
characterization of extremal equilibrium payo¤s requires a thorough analysis of equilibrium
bounds using the method of Shaked and Sutton (1984), see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990),
Muthoo (1999) or Houba and Bolt (2002) for surveys. However, since strategy proles may
involve unacceptable proposals it also implies that the method of Shaked and Sutton (1984)
should also be adapted to allow for such deliberate delays.
It is worthwhile to point out that our nding in this note does not change the qualitative
aspect of the main message of Slantchev (2003): The existence of equilibria with wasteful
ghting and delayed peace treaties. Since these equilibrium strategies revert to each nations
worst or extremal equilibrium as the most e¤ective punishments, downward modications in
the nationsextremal equilibrium payo¤s imply a weakening of conditions under which such
equilibria can be sustained in equilibrium. We hope our example raises the awareness of the
complications involved with extremal SPE in the negotiation model when two nations have
di¤erent time preferences.
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